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The Long Arm of the Law: Privacy Explored
Gary Price, Cofounder and Editor, infoDOCKET
William Hannay, Partner, Schiff Hardin
Lisa Macklin, Director, Scholarly Communications Office, Emory University Library
Moderated by Ann Okerson, Senior Advisor on Electronic Strategies, Center for Research Libraries (CRL)
The following is a transcript of a live presentation
at the 2015 Charleston Library Conference.
Ann Okerson: Well, good morning and welcome
to the sixth session of the “Long Arm of the Law.”
Thanks to Katina for thinking these topics are so
important that she makes sure that we get a
certain amount of airtime for them each year.
Every year we pick a topic or a court case or
something that we’re going to follow in this
session that will be of value to many, many in the
audience: librarians, publishers, and others. This
year we decided to focus on privacy, which is a
topic that is touching us all in every layer of our
lives. Privacy is the ability to control into whose
hands information falls. It is important because it
protects the rights and freedoms of all of us to live
as we please. Our speakers today are bringing to
us important perspectives about privacy in the
library, in publishing, and other settings. I'm going
to be very brief with these introductions. We’re
going to just run through them all very quickly.
The speakers will each take about 15 minutes, and
then with good luck we'll have some time left over
for audience discussion.
Our first speaker is Gary Price, who is known to
you in many ways for his work with Library
Journal, keeping us all informed and up to date
with infoDOCKET. He is going to speak about
technologies that libraries and publishers use—
deploy, often inadvertently—and how they might
compromise our privacy. The other day Gary told
me that my most frequently used airline, United,
doesn't encrypt their itinerary information enough
and it might be possible for people who care to do
this to find out where I'm going, and that freaked
me out. So, Gary is going to talk about things like
that. His mission here is to put the fear of God
into our minds as we go forward. Bill Hannay, who
Copyright of this contribution remains in the name of the author(s).
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is a repeat, regular offender here and one of our
most popular speakers, is going to talk about the
larger legal context, continuing a topic that he
started last year, which was the right to be
forgotten. And then Lisa Macklin is going to bring
the discussion directly into the academic setting
and discuss things that will be of issue in our
library context. So, that is our lineup for this
morning, and we thank you for being here. We
hope there is something in here of value to
everyone. So, Gary . . .
Gary Price: All right. Thank you, Ann. Good
morning, everyone. To continue with the Kenny
Rogers theme, hopefully by the end of this you
won't call me “Coward of the County.” Okay. I'm
here to put the fear of God in you, and hopefully
in the next 12 minutes we’ll do some of that and
also impart some useful knowledge to you as well.
So, library and Internet privacy. Bottom lines at
the top: awareness by all parties, discussion, and
education is a must and needed now. The privacy
that people expect from the library, and have
come to expect from the library over many, many
decades, is not where it should be in the digital
age and we need to do more. The first place to
begin is with discussion, education, and
knowledge of first ourselves and then our users.
Some of the good news is that there is work being
done by many organizations. Now in the last
couple of years we've seen interest from NISO.
They have a privacy initiative. The American
Library Association just released e‐book privacy
guidelines (http://www.ala.org/advocacy/library
‐privacy‐guidelines‐e‐book‐lending‐and‐digital
‐content‐vendors), for example, and there is
another funded project from the Knight
Foundation called the Library Freedom Project.
We are also seeing more publishers getting
involved. Some examples, and database
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providers—BiblioCommons, Project Muse,
OverDrive, BilblioBoard—are all now encrypting
the entire process, which includes the personally
identifiable data (your name, if you have to
register), but what I'm talking about is also the
transmission of data over the Internet, and we’ll
talk more about that in a moment.
Privacy is more than encryption. It is the local
data: How is it stored? The transaction laws: Is the
data being scrubbed? How often? Does your
library—and I've seen this in some of my research,
privacy policies from some libraries haven't been
updated in years: Is your library doing that? Are
you disclosing what's going on in a clear manner,
not on page 43 of some statement? What are we
doing with sharing with vendors? We can share
with vendors some of the things that Katherine
[Skinner] was talking about—we can use some of
this data—but we need to let our users know
what's going on. We ask transparency of others,
but we're not doing the job that we're asking of
others. We need to do a better job. The same
thing is going with data storage. There are third
parties involved. The library is just not a single
building now. The data is flying all over the place.
What is your relationship with the vendors? What
are their privacy policies? How will they contact
you? Will they contact you? How long after might
there be a data breach? Is the technology
configured correctly? Opt‐in services the vendors
provide: What are they doing with that data? If
you're e‐mailing results to a group of people, is
that data being saved? If it is, is it being scrubbed
after x amount of days? Is it just immediately
disappearing? We need to understand these
things and work with our vendors on these types
of issues. Is there a response plan in place locally
that, if there is a data breach, what will happen?
So, it's awareness, training, staying current, and
being vigilant because all of this changes on a very
regular basis.
I also have seen over the last few years that
perhaps we're a bit scared of what might happen,
but in my view that's kind of burying your head in
the sand. And in this day and age we can lose a lot
of respect from the general public and our users
for something that they respect us for—being a
pillar of privacy in our communities—with just one
23
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simple data breach, and the fact that somebody
can easily say, “Well, you never told us.” I believe
in this day and age we need to be out front on
these issues and, again, the transparency that we
ask of others, we need to become better at in this
particular topic. We need to be preemptive versus
reactive. If just about every European website can
have a cookie disclaimer on it, something that
simple, why aren’t we doing the same thing? For
example, when somebody borrows a book from
an e‐book provider and puts it on their Kindle,
that data is being shared with a third party. Are
we simply even disclosing this to our users? And
one thing that I've also learned over the last few
years is everybody has a different level of comfort
with privacy. So, if somebody doesn't want their
data stored indefinitely with Amazon, are we
showing them how to remove the data off of the
Amazon server? Are we providing them that
information? From what I've seen we need to do a
better job.
Now, we can talk about all the ethical reasons and
“this is what we have always done” reasons, but
put all of those aside for a moment. In the last few
years, privacy, data surveillance, and the like have
become a major topic both in the US and around
the world. My belief is that privacy, library privacy
and privacy in general, can be a wonderful
marketing opportunity for us as a community to
show our relevancy—something we are always
looking to do—with an issue that a lot of people
are talking about and interested in. For example,
the community campus can be a privacy
clearinghouse and leverage respect for our past
efforts, and public respect.
I'm going to skip through these [slides] and I'm
going to show you a little bit of a live demo, so let
me scroll through this here, and we’ll go over
here. So here it is, ladies and gentlemen. Your
term for this part of the presentation is sniffing,
and this is an open‐source‐type piece of
technology that I am, on a level from 1 to 10, on a
scale from 1 to 10, I am probably a 2 or 3 at. You
can take intensive classes on this. This tool called
Wireshark has conferences that keep people
updated. In a nutshell, this is all of the Wi‐Fi traffic
flowing through this room right now. You can
break it down and actually see sometimes, if it is

unencrypted, what somebody is doing. So I will
now, with the next tool I’ll show you, it makes it a
little bit easier to see what I'm talking about. This
is a piece of software—again, open‐sourced—
developed by a student at Iowa State University.
Instead of writing a master’s thesis paper he
developed this software. This takes all of the data
coming off of the unencrypted cookies coming
through Wireshark and makes them much more
easy to view without having to have a master’s
degree in that particular product. And this is
how—one of the tools—that I learned that Ann’s
airline and another European airline is sending
data unencrypted—including the passenger’s last
name and their passenger record number over the
Internet unencrypted—which I found to be rather
shocking.
Here are all of the people on Wi‐Fi on the network
right now. There's probably more, but this is what
we're seeing right now. Now, you're going to say,
“Well, Gary, so what if I’m learning that you're
searching x library and it says that you're looking
up whatever?” Well, another thing that's going on
right now, especially when you're thinking of
government surveillance and surveillance by
others, is that whatever you're doing—somebody
is searching books.Google.com—this tool also is
identified with the exact what is called the MAC
address, which is the unique ID of that person's
computer or electronic device, so there's two
pieces of data. There is no one holy grail of data.
In this day and age, having enough distinct data
points makes it relatively simple to figure out who
that specific person is. So, you can see now what
people are looking at—somebody's looking at the
CBC—that kind of thing. So those are the two
particular tools.
Now, let me go back to my slides for a moment
and give you a couple of actual examples. Am I
scaring the heck out of you? This is one slide, if we
can do this here. Can you see this right here? I'm
not going to make this one too big. Here is a
practical tip for you—especially for those of you
who own Apple devices, very often your device is
named after you. So, one of the things floating
through is not just that MAC address but it's your
specific name. You can see that here. (Play from
current slide.) You can see that somebody named

Jeff W., I blanked out his full name, was on the
Wi‐Fi yesterday at one of the conference hotels.
Do you see where I'm going with this? It’s these
distinct, a number of these distinct data points
merged together, which can be easily done now,
makes it very simple to figure out who someone is
and where they are.
Another thing that we're dealing with now all over
the Internet are things called tracking scripts and
beacons. These are pieces of code embedded in
the webpage that can provide all sorts of data.
Again, these are the types of analytics we were
talking about earlier—whether or not it is a good
thing or bad thing, that is up to the organization—
but my point is, gaining that knowledge and
sharing what's going on with our users. Also now
we are seeing beacons used in a mobile setting,
allowing people to be tracked throughout the
store or throughout the library. If your library is
doing that, what are you doing with that data
after the person walks out of the library? And are
you informing them in the first place that that’s
going on?
Your IP address can share a lot of information with
you. Now in this, case at my hotel, you're able to
see specifically where I am. This IP address is tied
to Charleston, South Carolina, but I've also been in
locations where it not only says that you're in this
city but where in this city you’re at. You're in the
lobby, for example, of the Mayflower Hotel in
Washington, DC. This is again more of a specific
example of the Cookie Cadger tool I just showed
you. Here I am, 9cf3, and here I am searching the
library of Congress OPAC, and you can see all of
the search suggestions as I'm typing in. All of that
is being sent over the Internet unencrypted. Here
is another view of that data. You can see the
referrer says I was looking at loc.gov, and then my
search term. This is another example, and in this
case the Google Analytics we’re sharing show that
this person was coming from library.caltech.edu.
This by itself isn't a bad thing, but again my point,
my takeaway from this, is we need to understand
what's going on first and then share that data with
our users.
Here is an example of a PubMed search. You
probably can't see it from here, but you can see all
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of my search terms and the specific data fields I
was searching. So, become privacy literate, first
step. It needs to be a major part, in my view, of
any digital literacy campaign that you’re doing.
Awareness of tools and concepts to minimize
exposure: So I've shared some of those with you. I
know Lisa [Macklin] is going to—hopefully we will
have time to talk about some of the things that
you can do if this is an issue for you at the library
level. But also for an individual, remember
everybody has a different threshold of comfort.
There are tools that you can use, but while you
can't—I would never get up here and say that you
can be completely private online and I can
guarantee it—but there are tools to, let’s say, put
“roadblocks” up to make it a little bit more
challenging to get to some of this data. It's not
rocket science to use them.
Stay current: Things change quickly, we all know
that. And discuss issues with colleagues and our
users. There are a lot of ethical issues, which we
will get into moving forward and then teach our
colleagues and users. I've also on the slide deck
that you'll get included some other examples. This
for example: the article Exposing the Hidden Web:
An Analysis of Third‐Party HTTP Requests on 1
Million Websites(http://arxiv.org/abs/1511
.00619v1) was just published in the past month.
So, again, I promised I would go a little bit short to
stay on schedule. I want to make Ann a happy
lady. One final comment: These types of tools,
Wireshark and Cookie Cadger, don't just work on
Wi‐Fi. You could plug an Ethernet cable on here
and get the same type of data as well. So, we will
have questions later. Thank you very much for
your time and attention. I hope I’ve scared you
just a little bit. Thank you.
Bill Hannay: The title of my program is “Please
Remember to Forget.” Catchy, right? I’m sure you
will remember because this program is all about
forgetting. And the larger topic, where’s all this
privacy stuff going? Is it going to turn into a flood,
or is it just a ripple? We’ll talk a little bit about
this.
As I mentioned last year, Europe, the European
Union, is very big into privacy issues. In particular,
unlike the United States, they have a very broad‐
reaching data privacy statute. It’s called a
25
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“directive,” but it’s effectively a statute. And its
idea is to protect individuals in the processing of
data about them. What they focus on is personal
data. Now, personal data actually has a very broad
definition in Europe: Any information relating to
any individual. Any individual! Any information!
Whether it relates to personal, private, or
professional life. It can be a name; it can be a
photo; it can be an e‐mail address. They don’t
have Social Security numbers over there, but if
they did, Social Security numbers, medical history,
really anything about them, particularly if it
happens to be of a deleterious nature. And why
are they concerned about this? A great quotation
from the memo written in the European Union
government, “With social networking sites, cloud
computing, location‐based services and smart
cards, we leave digital traces with every move we
make.” Gary just showed you some of your traces:
all you in the audience just buzzing around the
Internet when you’re supposed to be listening to
us. “We need a robust set of rules to make sure
people’s right to personal data protection . . . is
made effective” (EU Memo/12/41, Brussels, 2012,
http://europa.eu/rapid/press‐release_MEMO‐12
‐41_en.htm?locale=en, para. 1).
I kind of admire the European Union government
because they have apparently a sense of humor.
This is actually an official government cartoon
that’s on their data privacy website. It looks like a
student going into the free Internet café and
coming out embarrassed and totally naked
because of the information that this person has
logged onto the Internet doing an Internet search.
I am reminded of going into a library one time a
couple of years ago and waiting in line to speak to
a human being who was a reference librarian. And
there was a young person, who looked like a high
school student, standing, talking, kind of
whispering to the reference librarian. Whisper,
whisper. And the librarian leans back and says,
“Mildred! Where do we keep the books on sex
change operations?!?” So, information about
oneself can be disclosed in a number of ways.
You may remember last year we talked about a
man named Mario Costeja Gonzáles. And he
asked Google to take down some information
about him—that is, remove it, as in take down,

because this deleterious information, this
negative information about him had long since
ceased to be accurate and it was embarrassing. If
you did a search on his name, it would come up
with a couple of articles about the fact that he
had, well actually I won’t mention it because I
don’t want to publicize what his problem was. He
wanted this taken down, and they said, “Oh no,
we couldn’t do that.” So he goes to the
government agency in Spain and asks them to
make Google take this down. They enter an order,
Google appeals, it goes all the way to the
European Court of Justice, which is, on a regional
basis, like our United States Supreme Court; it’s
the highest court in Europe. The Court affirms the
order of this Spanish privacy agency and makes
Google take this down. But more than that, not
just fix the problem for Sr. Costeja Gonzáles, but
to actually order Google to set up a whole system
to do this for anyone who is subject to the data
privacy laws, or the protections of it. What they
ordered was that Google remove from the list of
search results any webpage links relating to an
individual if such information is “irrelevant” in
relation to the purposes for which data is
collected. You have to balance individual rights
against the collective rights of the public to know
things.

originally then filed a news report about the
removal of the report, and Google took that one
down too. So the long arm of the law extends on a
continuing basis.

Google has set up this system, and there’s a
request form here that you can go on the website
and say, “I’d like you to remove the following
information.” And they have been, this process
has been used an enormous amount in the past
year. As of this week, 338,000 requests have been
filed with Google in Europe to remove information
from 1.2 million URLs. Of those, 42% have actually
been removed, these search results. Now
understand, what that means is, it’s not whatever
the URL is has been removed from the Internet,
it’s that Google’s results will not produce that
URL. You can maybe still find it some other way if
you happen to know it, but you can’t search for it.
So, almost 10,000 URLs, the listing of them was
removed from Facebook.

The right to be forgotten is . . . not an
absolute right. There are cases where there is
a legitimate reason to keep data in a
database. The archives of a newspaper are a
good example. It is clear that the right to be
forgotten cannot amount to a right to re‐write
or erase history. (European Commission,
2015)

For example here, here’s one that in the UK
someone said that I’d like you to remove a minor
crime that I was involved with. Google did remove
it, and then the newspaper that had reported it

The EU is actually thinking of strengthening this
whole process and reaffirming the right to be
forgotten. They prepared an elaborative directive
in 2012, just a few months ago the Council of
Justice Ministers approved it, and it will now go to
the EU Parliament and the broader Council for
further action, and I expect that it will be enacted.
It addresses a number of things, not just right to
be forgotten, but they have reinforced the notion
that if an individual no longer wants their personal
data processed, and there’s no legitimate reason
to keep it, then it should be removed. But, this
proposal recognizes something that was
somewhat unclear under the prior codification,
which is that this is all subject to a careful
balancing of the right of freedom of expression,
for newspapers to print articles. Even though a
newspaper may be required to take it down, or
Google’s search will not find it, that has to be
taken into account.
Here’s a statement recently from the EU Justice
Commission, sort of the equivalent of our
attorney general:

Again, a balancing of the public’s rights and
private rights.
To update you on this thing: Not only are there
the hundreds and thousands of requests that are
going in Europe, it now is beginning to impact in
the United States because a French agency has
ordered Google to take down information—to
remove, to “delist” information—from its US‐
based website, from Google.com; not just
Google.es or Google.fr in Europe, because they’ve
been doing that. But now this French court says in
Plenary Sessions
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order for this to be fully effective, this whole right
to be forgotten thing, you have to take it down
everywhere that you, Google, have a website. And
so if you’ve got Google.com in the US, it’s got to
come out of that, too, because someone in
Europe could link to Google.com and do the
search, which would otherwise be prohibited in
Europe. The logic of this is, it’s an evasion
otherwise. Well, Google is not taking this lying
down. They’re going to appeal to the European
Court of Justice again. They’ve said, “We’re not
going to do this. We’re going to take the heat and
we’re going to go and appeal because you don’t
have any jurisdiction.” And what the French
agency says is that it isn’t a question of
jurisdiction over the United States—what we’re
saying is if you’ve got a website somewhere else
and someone in Europe can link to it, then you’ve
got to carry the right to be forgotten all the way
through those websites.
So, what is the significance of that to us in the
United States? Well, if they’re compelled to take
out information, to take down, to remove, to
delist information that you would otherwise be
able to find in the United States, it will no longer
be available to you. And this is in order to protect
the rights of someone in Europe. In the US, we
don’t have the right. We can’t ask Google to take
down negative information about us. If there was
a copyright violation, we can ask them to do that,
but not privacy. But, if you’re going to do a search
on Google.com, there will not be as much
information there as there once was. And so it
does impact us in the United States.
Just to close here, I just want to explain if you
have something to hide, you can now take steps
and then safely say [singing]:
The light is green, the web is clear,
So if you want to go surfing, dear,
I’m delighted, I’m delisted, I’m de‐Googled!
I understand the reason why
You’re curious, and just want to pry:
You’re de‐nosey, you’re de‐snooping, you’re
de‐peeping
You can tell at a glance
That the EU has taken a stance.
27
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You can hear their Court of Justice
Murmering low:
“You’ll never know.”
So, please be sweet, my chickadee,
And when you ask me, I’ll say to thee,
It’s delightful, it’s delisting,
It’s debatable, it’s deletable,
It’s defensive, it’s delib’rate, it’s deleted,
It’s de‐Googled.
Lisa Macklin: So, that's a hard act to follow. I do
have to tell you that I once sent a friend of mine a
birthday card that said, “In honor of your birthday,
I will not sing.” And so I will not sing and you
should be very grateful for that. So, I'm going to
talk to you about privacy in libraries and really try
and take what Gary and Bill have said and kind of
bring them back into our everyday lives, if you
will.
So, in the US we have several sources of privacy.
As Bill mentioned, in the US we don't have this
sense of privacy and privacy laws that they have in
Europe, and so we find that we do have a
patchwork, if you will, of federal laws—FERPA
being an example within higher ed—and state
laws. There is a common law right of privacy and
there are some state statutes for privacy, and
then we also have some state statutes specifically
for libraries that really do vary by state, and they
do dictate the confidentiality of library records.
However, those state laws often don't include
library records that might be hosted by a third
party, for example. And there's a list of various
state laws on the ALA website, so if you're not
familiar with your state law I would suggest that
you take a look there and really begin to
understand what your state law says regarding
privacy.
We also have institutional policies on privacy if
you're in an academic institution; however, much
of our own library policies really are not stemming
as much from a law as they are stemming from
the ALA code of ethics. And essentially that code
of ethics has been the grounding of library policy
for a number of years, and it’s essentially
protecting the library user’s right to privacy and to
confidentiality. This goes to that core library
mission of providing open and equal access to our

collections, and we do this in order to enable
education and free inquiry, those kinds of
cornerstones of a democracy. However, privacy is
not absolute, and we have to balance user privacy
with our other constraints around efficiencies,
requirements of law enforcement, and then just
plain old Internet security. Much of our privacy
practices are really rooted in our history of
deleting circulation records when somebody has
returned a book. They’re really grounded in the
days of almost complete print collections.
However, technology has expanded both our
collections and our services, and Gary has
demonstrated how easy it is to track a user on the
Internet. So, let's talk about doing a privacy audit
for library services and what you might want to
think about.
Three questions that I think are worth asking . . .
First of all, do you have a library privacy policy?
Have you reviewed it lately? Does it pertain only
to your print collections? Does it apply to online
collections and take into account the changes that
we've seen recently? Does it align with federal
and state law in your institutional policies? I came
up with, well, let me backtrack a tad bit. I do want
to say that policies are really important because
they provide transparency, and they do provide
assurances to our users, but it's in implementing
practices that I really think we can make the most
difference. And I do think that we all have a role
to play in that, so I came up with kind of these
three questions. Use them if they’re useful to you,
but I don't think that we always ask these
questions when we should.
The first is, what data is being collected? And Gary
gave us examples that I don't think some of us are
always aware of. Who has access to that data?
And then do users have the option to opt out? So,
putting that another way, can users search,
access, and read anonymously? Or, if they're using
a particular service, are they actually
automatically getting tracked in ways that they
don't realize? For systems librarians and
technologists—really looking at ILS systems,
search and discovery systems, mobile apps, library
webpages—we need to consider what data is
really being collected. How securely is it stored?
How securely is it transmitted? Is personally

identifiable information encrypted? For our
vendor colleagues, have you tested your systems
for vulnerabilities? If you provide hosting services,
how securely are patron and user data stored? For
those who do usability testing—of which, quite
frankly, I'm a big fan—I think we need to be aware
for collecting personally identifiable information
as part of usability testing, realize that we
probably need to be anonymizing that
information. We need to make certain that the
participants understand the parameters of the
data collection, and the use that we're going to
make of that data. For scholarly communications
librarians, most of our institutional repositories do
have basic hit and download information, which is
pretty generic and anonymized, but we do have
some repositories that have sensitive data and
other kinds of things where you have to register
as a user to actually download the files. So how
are we tracking that information, storing it? Do
we delete it on a regular basis?
For collections librarians, do you know what data
the vendor of those collections and online
materials is collecting? Is there digital rights
management software attached to those files?
How is that data collected used? With whom is it
shared? Now, data collection is not, in and of
itself, a bad thing. We in libraries need to know
how our collections are used. We make collection
decisions on a regular basis based on use statistics
that are provided from vendors. But do we need
that information for each individual user, or is that
information in the aggregate really what it is that
we need to make those decisions? So, for
electronic resources librarians, are you
negotiating for terms in your license agreements
that protect user confidentiality and privacy? We
can do, by contract law, what we don't necessarily
in this country have laws to protect privacy for.
For publishers and content providers, we need
your help. We understand that you have a desire
to track your content and how it’s used, but we
ask that you also understand that tracking and
storing who is reading what is in direct conflict
with our values and our ethics. Katherine touched
on this in her presentation as well.
Liaisons and subject librarians, I will echo what
Gary has already said—that we really need to be
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teaching our users, including our faculty as well
their students, about privacy as part of
information and digital literacy. So you have a
very big role to play in educating users. We need
to support our users’ ability to make informed
choices. I've used Facebook here as an example, in
part because they have improved their user
privacy over the last several years, often as a way
of reacting to user feedback. And when I logged
into Facebook a couple of days ago it asked me if I
wanted to review my privacy settings, so they've
gotten more proactive in how they really
approach privacy. But I think we in libraries really
need to be proactive. We shouldn't be waiting for
an incident or user demand to really be
addressing user privacy.
For all of us, whether you are a librarian, a
technologist, a publisher, or some combination of
the three, you need to understand the contours of
privacy law, and our legal and ethical obligations.
And most importantly, as Gary showed, we really
need to understand how technology works, both
to invade our privacy and to protect our privacy.
We need to regularly question privacy
implications of new tools and services. And we
need to keep current, which I realize is a huge

challenge since technology is going to continue to
change. So Gary's infoDOCKET is one great
example of that. The ALA’s Washington office is
also another example where they regularly will
have information about privacy.
Finally, and most importantly, be an advocate. We
all have a role to play, and I've given you this
laundry list not expecting you to go back to your
institutions and do everything all at once. But my
hope is that each of you can have a takeaway
from this panel discussion to do, that you will go
back to your institutions and think about and
consider. As our collections are becoming
increasingly digital, and our services are often
hosted on platforms and servers even outside of
our own institutions, our sensitivity to patron
privacy really does need to increase. Fulfilling our
library mission of providing equal and open access
to our collections to enable education and to
enable free inquiry relies on libraries remaining a
trusted institution. When users recognize or fear
that their privacy or confidentiality is
compromised, then the freedom of inquiry no
longer really exists. And that, I think, is the thing
we need to guard against. Thank you.
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